One of the key principles of EU Competition law is a prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position established in the Article 102 of the TFEU. Predatory pricing is one of the forms of the abuse of dominant position. To decide whether the dominant undertaking has referred to predatory pricing it is necessary to check several elements: costs and prices of the dominant undertaking; the possibility to recoup losses; intent; and objective justifications. The Court of Justice, the European Commission and competition institutions in most member states perform extensive analysis of a relationship between costs and prices of a dominant undertaking while dealing with cases on predatory pricing. However, we believe that competition authorities should pay more attention to evaluation and to whether pricing will cause elimination of competitors and damage to consumers. This article critically reviews the framework of the analysis of predatory pricing in the practice of the Court of Justice and the European Commission.
INTRODUCTION
From 1890, the courts of the United States began to deal with predatory pricing cases. State institutions of the US especially aimed to protect small undertakings from the establishment of low prices by the dominant undertakings. To recognize the actions of the dominant undertaking as illegal, it was necessary to establish 'predatory' settlement of low prices and damage to competitors.
The definitions of predatory pricing provided in judicial practice and jurisprudence are quite similar. We propose the following definition: predatory pricing occurs when the dominant undertaking sets prices lower than the costs of production and excludes competitors or creates additional barriers for new competitors to enter the market and subsequently establishes high prices, which could not have been established without the exclusion of the competitors (or creation of additional barriers), thus causing damage to the consumers.
Usually the Court of Justice focuses on analysis of four key elements in predatory pricing instead of focusing on application of a concept of predatory pricing to the circumstances of the case. Firstly, it analyses whether the price of the products covers all the costs. There are different cost benchmarks: average variable costs, average avoidable costs, average total costs and long run average incremental costs.
Secondly, it analyses whether the dominant undertaking by establishment of low prices intends to eliminate competitors from the market, to increase its share in the market. Thirdly, it analyses whether the actions of the alleged predator may exclude competitors from the market and whether dominant undertaking will be able to recoup experienced losses. Fourthly, it analyses whether the predator may justify illegal actions by providing objective justifications. In this article, we will focus on the abovementioned main elements of predatory pricing, since they are analysed in the cases on predation.
This article is structured in accordance with the analysis of the main elements of predatory pricing. Section II covers the main goals of competition law. Section III focuses on pricing below costs. Section IV discusses predatory intent. Section V focuses on recoupment of losses. Section VI is devoted to objective justifications.
Section VII provides conclusions. 8 Richard H. Koller, Predatory pricing in a market economy (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 4. 9 Ibid. 10 Christian Ahlborn and Bill Allan, "The Napp Case: A study of predation?" World Competition Vol. 26(2) (2003) .
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In Continental Can and British Airways cases the Court of Justice stated that the Article 102 prohibits not only actions of the dominant undertakings, which directly harm consumers, but also such actions that harm consumers through negative impact on an effective competition structure. 22 In the France Telecom case the General Court dismissed the argument made by the Wanadoo Company that the pricing policy of Wanadoo did not cause any damage to consumers and even was beneficial to them. The Court claimed that the competition law protects the structure of the market from false distortions, since in such case the interests of the consumers are safeguarded in a best way. According to the Court, it is not necessary to prove that certain behaviour causes direct negative effect to the consumers. 23 Analysis of the practice of the Court of Justice and the Commission does not allow clearly identifying one dominant goal of the EU competition law.
The EU judicial institutions emphasize the need to protect effective competition, the competitors and the consumers. 24 It seems that practically the Court of Justice focuses on an evaluation of whether dominant undertakings cause damage to competition and competitors, instead of evaluating whether the consumers have suffered any damage. The Court of Justice should focus on the question whether the actions of the dominant undertaking caused any damage to the consumers. Such evaluation should be done instead of raising the question of whether the dominant undertaking damaged competitors and consequently hampered "effective competition structure". We believe that only actions which may affect the wealth of the consumers consequently, should be recognized as detrimental to "effective competition structure". In case actions of the dominant undertaking do not cause damage to the consumers, then, despite the effect on the competitors, we should not recognize that the structure of the market is damaged. 25 It is necessary for the Court of Justice and the Commission to formulate a consistent approach to how the damage caused to the consumers might be established. 26 From a practical point of view, it is important to evaluate the negative economic effect of the actions of the dominant undertakings and harm caused to the 26 The need to reconsider the current approach to the predatory pricing is also discussed in Einer R. consumers. Ignoring the abovementioned criteria may result in controversial decisions of the competition institutions and the courts. 27 In predatory pricing cases damage to the consumers will appear only if the dominant undertaking may recoup losses. Without actual recoupment of the losses taking place, only competitors may experience the damage. Consequently, if protection of the consumers is recognized as the main goal of the competition law, then recoupment of losses should be recognized as a necessary constituent element of predatory pricing. Therefore, predatory pricing should be viewed as illegal only if it is possible to prove recoupment of losses. At the same time, we should bear in mind that Article 102 is not a part of consumer protection law; thus, to establish breach of Article 102, it is also necessary to prove restriction of competition when legality of exclusionary abuse is assessed. 28 Therefore, the competition authority has to prove that damage to consumers has been caused by the illegal restriction of competition. 
PRICING BELOW COSTS

AVERAGE VARIABLE COSTS TEST
Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner proposed the first test for analysis of predatory pricing on the basis of costs. 30 Areeda and Turner claimed that undertakings engage in predatory pricing quite rarely, therefore rules which prohibit such actions should be very clear and should not deter undertakings from legitimate pricing. 31 The scholars noted that price which is higher than average variable costs should be legal and the price which is lower than average variable costs should be illegal. 32 Nowadays competition institutions mostly follow the proposal of Areeda and Turner and do not refer to marginal costs. 33 Scientific theory of Turner and Areeda received wide recognition in the courts of the United States. 34 The Court of Justice relied on this test in the first case on 27 number of competition councils from the other member states. 42 Average avoidable cost is the average per unit cost that the alleged predator would have avoided during the period of below-cost pricing had it not produced the predatory increment of sales. 43 We should point out a number of limitations for the use of the average avoidable test. Firstly, the average variable costs test has the same drawbacks as the average avoidable costs. Secondly, in certain cases the benchmark of the average avoidable costs will be higher than the benchmark of the average variable costs. Thus, in such cases it is easier to prove that the undertaking engaged in predatory pricing. 
LONG-RUN AVERAGE INCREMENTAL COSTS
A long-run average incremental cost is the average of all the costs that are incurred to produce a particular product. 45 The Commission in the Deutsche Post case admitted that the undertaking, which produces several goods will not be recognized as a predator if its income covers incremental costs of provision of certain service. 46 The Commission indicates two situations when establishment of prices lower than long-run average incremental costs means predation. Firstly, it might be the case if certain business is a monopoly. 47 Secondly, it also might be the case if specific costs relate to sectors that were liberalized recently or in which liberalization is in progress, for example, the telecom sector. 
PRICES HIGHER THAN AVERAGE AVOIDABLE COSTS AND SMALLER THAN AVERAGE TOTAL COSTS
While a dominant undertaking has no reason to establish prices below average avoidable costs, since such prices do not maximize profit, it may have found reasonable establishment of prices above average avoidable cost but below average total cost. 53 Average total costs are calculated by dividing total costs (fixed and variable costs) by many produced goods. 54 Recently the Court of Justice in Post Danmark case confirmed that prices below average total costs, but above average variable costs, must be regarded as illegal only if additional evidence on intent to eliminate competitors is present. 55 Such position of the Court is widely supported. 56 We believe that it is possible to apply average total cost test only if special circumstances are present, since in this case variable and part of fixed costs are covered, and pricing of the undertaking does not accrue as many losses as establishment of prices, which are smaller than average variable/average avoidable costs.
PRICES HIGHER THAN AVERAGE TOTAL COSTS
Establishment of prices higher than average total costs normally does not amount to predatory pricing. Usually, such pricing eliminates only less effective competitors and is illegal only if there are exceptional circumstances, which show that consumers experience disadvantage. 57 Firstly, establishment of prices higher than average total costs amounts to predatory pricing when undertakings in a collective dominant position apply strategy to eliminate certain undertaking and reduce its revenue, propose to certain clients' goods/services for a price lower than relevant undertaking, and mutually share losses which are experienced because of detrimental trade. 58 The Secondly, the Commission proposed to recognise the establishment of prices higher than average total costs as predation when the dominant undertaking has unique advantages or acts in the market where economies of scale are very important, and entrants to the market initially will have to operate at a significant cost disadvantage. 60 We believe prices higher than average total costs should not be treated as predation. Most competition institutions from different countries recognize that pricing above average total costs does not constitute predation. 61 Prohibition to apply prices higher than average total costs may deter the dominant undertaking from competing effectively and cause appearance of ineffective competitors. Thus, prohibition of such pricing would not be beneficial for consumers. 
PREDATORY INTENT
The judicial institutions of the European Union recognise the intent of the dominant undertaking as an important element in predation cases. 63 The significance of the intent of the dominant undertaking in specific case depends on the relationship between costs and price. 64 In case the undertaking establishes price smaller than average variable/avoidable costs, the presumption of predatory pricing and illegal intent is made. However, in case undertaking sets prices higher than average variable/avoidable costs, then to recognise predation it is necessary to prove illegal intent of the undertaking. 65 Judicial institutions of the European Union do not admit ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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that dominant undertaking referred to predatory pricing only based on the evidence of illegal intent. 66 In the US intention is not viewed as important while evaluating the actions of the dominant undertakings. 67 In the US, intention is not given primary importance, partly because the evidence concerning the intent of the undertaking might easily misguide the jury differently from judges. 68 Some scholars notice that managers of the undertakings have a better opportunity than officials of the competition councils to evaluate profitability of predatory pricing and the extent to which it may distort competition. 69 The Court of Justice emphasized importance of the intent of dominant undertaking in 1978 in the United Brands case. 70 The Court of Justice held s that in certain cases intention to eliminate competitor is the decisive factor for recognition of predation. 71 The Court of Justice claimed that if undertaking sets prices higher than average variable costs and smaller than average total costs the undertaking has an opportunity to eliminate even effective competitors without experiencing losses.
72
In AKZO case the Court of Justice recognized that the selective nature of the setting of the prices smaller than average total costs and higher than average variable prices witnesses that AKZO intended to eliminate a competitor from the market.
73
When the undertaking establishes prices lower than average variable costs and intent to eliminate competitors is established, then we should allow the undertaking to justify its pricing. 74 Sometimes the undertaking may justify the motives of its behaviour. We should also aim to evaluate the ability of undertaking to recoup 66 Almost all competition institutions in the world take the position that it is not sufficient to provide evidence concerning illegal intent of undertaking to prove that undertaking was engage in predatory pricing. Thirdly, officers of competition institutions should devote interest not to the intent of undertaking, but to the research whether the pricing of dominant undertaking will lead to the elimination of competitors. We believe that only distortion of the competition should be taken into account recognizing abuse. In France Telecom SA case, the General Court decided that recoupment of losses is not necessary in predation. 94 Wanadoo Company claimed that it had no possibility to recoup losses and therefore it has not used predatory pricing. 95 The
RECOUPMENT OF LOSSES
RECOUPMENT OF LOSSES IN PREDATION CASES
General Court dismissed necessity to prove recoupment. The Court declared that it is sufficient to prove prices of the undertaking were smaller than average variable costs and the undertaking aimed to abuse dominance. 96 It is interesting to note that in the analysis of the appeal claim Advocate General
Mazak wrote that it is necessary to prove that the dominant undertaking is able to recoup losses. 97 We may also refer to AKZO case which declared that a dominant undertaking has no interest to establish prices below average variable costs except that of eliminating competitors to enable it subsequently to raise its prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position, since each sale generates a loss, namely the total amount of the fixed costs. 98 The Court recognizes that undertaking refers to predatory pricing, because it expects to recoup losses later (gain some profit).
Moreover, it is provided in Hoffmann-La Roche case 99 that the concept of abuse is an abusive. 102 This decision ended discussion whether under the EU competition law it is necessary to prove ability of the predator to recoup losses. We believe that this decision of the Court lacks legal reasoning. We presume that one of causes why the 
THE ABILITY OF THE DOMINANT UNDERTAKING TO RECOVER LOSSES
The Commission believes that when an undertaking is dominant, it also follows that entry barriers are high enough and such undertaking can recoup losses. and dominant undertakings will refrain from establishment of low prices that are beneficial for consumers.
OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS
MEETING COMPETITION DEFENCE
Competitions institutions in most countries of the world recognize that it is possible to justify the establishment of prices lower than costs based on the meeting In the Hilti case, the Commission recognized the meeting competition defence. 118 The meeting competition defence also was recognized in AKZO case. 119 The establishment of small prices based on a meeting competition defence should be proportional and fit for the actual circumstances. 120 We regret that in the practice of the Court of Justice, the content of the meeting competition defence is interpreted ambiguously and the dominant undertakings face some lack of legal certainty.
121
In 1997, Commission took informal decision in Digital Undertaking case in which
Commission affirmed obligations of the dominant undertaking previously accused of abuse of dominant position. 122 Digital company aiming to resolve the case peacefully took obligation to ensure that all reduced prices will be higher than average total costs 123 . Digital reserved right to lower prices in response to competition but undertook obligation that such reduction will be proportional and will not disturb competition.
124
144
In 127 In the opinion of the Court, the dominant undertaking has a right to protect its business interests in case they are endangered, but may not refer to actions, which are intended to strengthen dominant position and abuse it.
The Court also noted that even if the dominant undertaking refers to certain action protecting commercial interests and alignment of prices with its competitors "is not in itself abusive or objectionable, it might become so where it is aimed not only at protecting its interests but also at strengthening and abusing its dominant Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings' Commission provides that it seems unlikely that dominant undertaking accused of predatory pricing will be able to rely on efficiency defence, since it is doubtful that predatory pricing will create efficiencies. 134 Dominant undertaking in order to rely on the efficiencies defence, should prove the following criteria: 1) efficiencies are/or will be achieved because of certain actions, for example, improvement of the quality of products; 2) certain actions are necessary in order to increase efficiencies, that is it is not possible to rely on the other, not so anti-competitive actions; 3) Increased efficiencies compensate negative effect on competition and consumers; 4) actions should not limit competition, since competition is the source of economic effectiveness. 135 As we may conclude, conditions applied to the Article 102 of the TFEU are in essence similar to part 3 of the Article 101 of the TFEU. 136 In Post Danmark case the Court of Justice explicitly held that a dominant undertaking may justify its predatory actions by demonstrating, either that its conduct is objectively necessary or that the exclusionary effect produced may be counterbalanced, outweighed even, by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers. 137 The undertaking may rely on the objective necessity defence if it could prove that actions were objectively necessary, for example, because of security or health reasons related to dangerous qualities of certain products. 138 According to the Court of Justice, dominant undertaking is not allowed to take action ex officio in order to The dominant undertaking may establish prices smaller than costs of certain goods, to encourage consumers to buy other goods for higher prices. For example, grocer's shop may implement advertising campaign, during which the price of orange juice is lower than costs, expecting that buyers will also buy other goods.
CONCLUSIONS
After a review of the framework for the analysis of the predation cases, we can make several conclusions. The Court of Justice, the General Court and the Commission while assessing predatory pricing give too much importance to the intent of the dominant undertaking. We believe that intention to predate should be only additional evidence for the determination of abuse. Strategic plans of the undertaking may provide evidence that undertaking aims to eliminate competitors; however, managers of companies do not always make the correct decisions and often do not achieve business goals.
We propose recognizing that dominant undertaking referred to predatory pricing only if there is evidence that the dominant undertaking may recoup losses. In case recoupment is recognized as a necessary element, competition institutions would evaluate whether dominant undertakings' actions caused damage to consumers. If recoupment is not considered, competition law rules might be too strict and dominant undertakings will not charge low prices that are beneficial for consumers. It is possible that such position will gain more support if private subjects submit more claims to dominant undertakings aiming to compensate damages incurred because of the application of predatory pricing.
The position of the Commission towards objective justifications should be modified since conditions for the application of such defences are too strict and ill defined. Therefore, the ability to rely on such defences is limited. The Court of Justice and the General Court should recognize the right of the dominant undertaking to submit objective justifications of its actions in all cases, irrespective of whether prices applied are lower than costs. Therefore, the right of the dominant undertaking to set prices lower than average avoidable costs should be legal if the competitors use such pricing.
